Military Benefits
Listed Chronologically
Alabama
Divisible as of August 1993 when the Alabama Supreme Court held that disposable
military retirement benefits accumulated during the course of the marriage
are divisible as marital property, Vaughn v. Vaughn, 634 So.2d 533 (Ala.
1993). Kabaci v. Kabaci, 373 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) and cases
relying on it that are inconsistent with Vaughn are expressly overruled.
Note that Alabama has previously awarded alimony from military retired
pay, Underwood v. Underwood, 491 So. 2d 242 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (wife
awarded alimony from husband's military disability retired pay); Phillips
v. Phillips, 489 So. 2d 592 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (wife awarded 50% of
husband's gross military pay as alimony).
Alaska
Divisible. Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1983), overruling Cose
v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1982).
Non-vested retirement benefits are divisible. Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 649
(Alaska 1987). Note also Morlan v. Morlan, 720 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1986)
(the trial court ordered a civilian employee to retire in order to ensure
the spouse received her share of a pension--the pension would be suspended
if the employee continued working; on appeal, the court held that the
employee should have been given the option of continuing to work and periodically
paying the spouse the sums she would have received from the retired pay;
in reaching this result, the court cited the California Gillmore decision).
See also Clausen v. Clausen, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992) which held that
while Mansell precludes division of disability benefits received in lieu
of retirement pay, it does not preclude consideration of these payments
when making an equitable division of marital assets.
Arizona
Divisible. DeGryse v. DeGryse, 135 Ariz. 335, 661 P.2d 185 (1983); Edsall
v. Superior Court of Arizona, 143 Ariz. 240, 693 P.2d 895 (1984); Van
Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977) (a nonvested military
pension is community property). A civilian retirement plan case (Koelsch
v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 713 P.2d 1234 (1986)) held that if the employee
is not eligible to retire at the time of the dissolution, the court must
order that the spouse begin receiving the awarded share of retired pay
when the employee becomes eligible to retire, whether or not he or she
does retire at that point.
Arkansas
Divisible, but watch for vesting requirements. Young v. Young, 288 Ark.
33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); but see Durham v. Durham, 289 Ark. 3, 708 S.W.2d
618 (1986) (military retired pay not divisible where the member had not
served 20 years at the time of the divorce, and therefore the military
pension had not "vested"). See also Burns v. Burns, 31 Ark.
61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993) (In accord with Durham, but strong dissent favors
rejecting 20 years of service as a prerequisite to "vesting"
of a military pension).
California
Divisible. In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1974); In re Hopkins, 142 Cal. App. 3d 350, 191 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1983).
A non-resident servicemember did not waive his right under the USFSPA
to object to California's jurisdiction over his military pension by
consenting to the court's jurisdiction over other marital and property
issues, Tucker v. Tucker, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1249 (1991) and Hattis v. Hattis,
242 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 1987). Nonvested pensions are divisible;
In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
In re Mansell, 265 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. App. 1989) (on remand from Mansell
v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), the court held that gross retired pay
was divisible since it was based on a stipulated property settlement to
which res judicata had attached). State law has held that military disability
retired pay is divisible to the extent it replaces what the retiree would
have received as longevity retired pay (In re Mastropaolo, 166 Cal. App.
3d 953, 213 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1985); In re Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977), but the Mansell case raises doubt about the continued
validity of this proposition. If the member is not retired at the time
of the dissolution, the spouse can elect to begin receiving the award
share of "retired pay" when the member becomes eligible to retire,
or anytime thereafter, even if the member remains on active duty. In re
Luciano, 104 Cal. App. 3d 956, 164 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1980); see also In re
Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981) (same
principle applied to a civilian pension plan).
Colorado
Divisible. In re Marriage Of Beckman and Holm, 800 P.2d 1376 (Colo. 1990)
(nonvested military retirement benefits constitute marital property subject
to division pursuant to § 14-10- 113, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B)).
See also In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, (Colo. 1996), reversing a previous
decision of its own, the Colorado Supreme Court holds that post-divorce
increases in pay resulting from promotions are marital property subject
to division and approves use of a formula to define the marital share.
In the formula discussed, final pay of the member at retirement is multiplied
a percentage defined by 50% of a fraction wherein the numerator equals
the number of years of overlap between marriage and service, and the denominator
equals the number of years of total service of the member.
Connecticut
Probably divisible. Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-81 (1986) gives courts broad
power to divide property. Note Thompson v. Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 438
A.2d 839 (1981) (nonvested civilian pension is divisible).
Delaware
Divisible. Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983). Nonvested
pensions are divisible; Donald R.R. v. Barbara S.R., 454 A.2d 1295 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1982). District of Columbia Divisible. See Barbour v. Barbour,
464 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1983) (vested but unmatured civil service pension held
divisible; dicta suggests that nonvested pensions also are divisible).
Florida
Divisible. As of October 1, 1988, all vested and nonvested pension plans
are treated as marital property to the extent that they are accrued during
the marriage. Fla. Stat. § 61.075(3)(a)4 (1988); see also §
3(1) of 1988 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 342. These legislative changes appear
to overrule the prior limitation in Pastore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635
(Fla. 1986) (only vested military retired pay can be divided). This interpretation
was recently adopted by the court in Deloach v. Deloach, 590 So.2d 956
(Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991).
Georgia
Probably divisible. Cf. Courtney v. Courtney, 256 Ga. 97, 344 S.E.2d 421
(1986) (nonvested civilian pensions are divisible); Stumpf v. Stumpf,
249 Ga. 759, 294 S.E.2d 488 (1982) (military retired pay may be considered
in establishing alimony obligations) see also Hall v. Hall, 51B.R. 1002
(1985) (Georgia divorce judgment awarding debtor's wife 38% of debtor's
military retirement, payable directly from the United States to the wife,
granted the wife a nondischargeable property interest in 38% of the husband's
military retirement); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987)
(the court "[a]ssum[ed] that vested and nonvested military retirement
benefits acquired during the marriage are now marital property subject
to equitable division," citing Stumpf and Courtney, but then decided
that military retired pay could not be divided retroactively if it was
not subject to division at the time of the divorce).
Hawaii
Divisible. Linson v. Linson, 1 Haw. App. 272, 618 P.2d 748 (1981); Cassiday
v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133 (Haw. 1986). In Wallace v. Wallace, 5 Haw.
App. 55, 677 P.2d 966 (1984), the court ordered a Public Health Service
employee (who is covered by the USFSPA) to pay a share of retired pay
upon reaching retirement age whether or not he retires at that point.
He argued that this amounted to an order to retire, violating 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(c)(3), but the court affirmed the order. In Jones v. Jones,
780 P.2d 581 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989), the court ruled that Mansell's
limitation on dividing VA benefits cannot be circumvented by awarding
an offsetting interest in other property. It also held that Mansell applies
to military disability retired pay as well as VA benefits.
Idaho
Divisible. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975) (reinstated
by Griggs v. Griggs, 197 Idaho 123, 686 P.2d 68 (1984)). Courts cannot
circumvent Mansell's limitation on dividing VA benefits by using an
offset against other property. Bewley v. Bewley, 780 P.2d 596 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989). See Leatherman v. Leatherman, 122 Idaho 247, 833 P.2d 105
(1992). A portion of husband's civil service annuity attributable
to years of military service during marriage was divisible military service
benefit and thus subject to statute relating to modification of divorce
decrees to include division of military retirement benefits. See also
Balderson v. Balderson, 896 P.2d 956 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1995) (cert. denied
by the U.S. Supreme Court, 116 S.Ct. 179 (mem.) (affirming a lower court
decision ordering a servicemember to pay spouse her community share of
the military pension, even though he had decided to put off retirement),
Mosier v. Mosier, 122 Idaho 37, 830 P.2d 1175 (1992), and Walborn v. Walborn,
120 Idaho 494, 817 P.2d 160 (1991).
Illinois
Divisible. In re Brown, 225 Ill. App. 3d 733, 587 N.E.2d 648 (1992); the
Court cites Congress' enactment of the Spouses' Protection Act
(Pub.L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat, 730-38 (1982) as the basis to permit the
courts to treat pay of military personnel in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction of the court (In re Dooley, 137 Ill. App. 3d 407, 484
N.E.2d 894 (1985)). The court in Brown held that a military pension may
be treated as marital property under Illinois law and is subject to the
division provisions of 5/503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act). See In re Korper, 131 Ill. App. 3d
753, 475 N.E.2d 1333 (1985). Korper points out that under Illinois law
a pension is marital property even if it is not vested. In Korper, the
member had not yet retired, and he objected to the spouse getting the
cash-out value of her interest in retired pay. He argued that the USFSPA
allowed division only of "disposable retired pay," and state
courts therefore are preempted from awarding the spouse anything before
retirement. The court rejected this argument, thus raising the (unaddressed)
question whether a spouse could be awarded a share of "retired"
pay at the time the member becomes eligible for retirement (even if he
or she does not retire at that point); see In re Luciano, 104 Cal. App.
3d 956, 164 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1980) for an application of such a rule. Note
also Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 40, para. 510.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (allows
modification of agreements and judgments that became final between 25
June 1981 and 1 February 1983 unless the party opposing modification shows
that the original disposition of military retired pay was appropriate).
Indiana
Divisible, but watch for vesting requirements. Indiana Code § 31-1-11.5-2(d)(3)
(1987) (amended in 1985 to provide that "property" for marital
dissolution purposes includes, inter alia, "[t]he right to receive
disposable retired pay, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a), acquired
during the marriage, that is or may be payable after the dissolution of
the marriage"). The right to receive retired pay must be vested as
of the date the divorce petition in order for the spouse to be entitled
to a share (Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1990)), but courts
should consider the nonvested military retired benefits in adjudging a
just and reasonable division of property. In re Bickel, 533 N.E.2d 593
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989). See also Arthur v. Arthur, 519 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988) (Second District ruled that § 31-1-11.5-2(d)(3) cannot
be applied retroactively to allow division of military retired pay in
a case filed before the law's effective date, which was 1 September
1985). But see Sable v. Sable, 506 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (Third
District ruled that § 31-1-11.5-2(d)(3) can be applied retroactively).
Iowa
Divisible. See especially In re Howell, 434 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1989). In
Howell, the member had already retired in this case, but the decision
may be broad enough to encompass nonvested retired pay as well. The court
also ruled that disability payments from the Veterans Administration,
paid in lieu of a portion of military retired pay, are not marital property.
Finally, it appears the court intended to award the spouse a percentage
of gross military retired pay, but it actually "direct[ed] that 30.5%
of [the husband's] disposable retired pay, except disability benefits,
be assigned to [the wife] in accordance with section 1408 of Title 10
of the United States Code..." (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme
Court's Mansell decision may have overruled state court decisions
holding courts have authority to divide gross retired pay. (Note: A disabled
veteran may be required to pay alimony and/or child support in divorce
actions, even where his only income is veterans' disability and supplemental
security income. See In re Marriage of Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa App.
1994), applying Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d
599 (1987). The Iowa Court of Appeals ruled: "It is clear veteran's
benefits are not solely for the benefit of the veteran, but for his family
as well.")
Kansas
Divisible. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-201(b) (1987), effective July 1,
1987 (vested and nonvested military pensio ns are now marital property);
In re Harrison, 13 Kan. App. 2d 313, 769 P.2d 678 (1989) (applies the
statute and holds that it overruled the previous case law that prohibited
division of military retired pay).
Kentucky
Divisible. Jones v. Jones, 680 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1984); Poe v. Poe, 711
S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (military retirement benefits are marital
property even before they "vest"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
403.190 (1994), expressly defines marital property to include retirement benefits.
Louisiana
Divisible. Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La. 1975); Little v. Little,
513 So. 2d 464 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (nonvested and unmatured military retired
pay is marital property); Warner v. Warner, 651 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1995)
(confirming that 10-year test found in 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) is
a prerequisite to direct payment, but not to award of a share of retired
pay to a former spouse); Gowins v. Gowins, 466 So. 2d 32 (La. Sup. Ct.
1985) (soldier's participation in divorce proceedings constituted
implied consent for the court to exercise jurisdiction and divide the
soldier's military retired pay as marital property); Jett v. Jett,
449 So. 2d 557 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Rohring v. Rohring, 441 So. 2d 485
(La. Ct. App. 1983). See also Campbell v. Campbell, 474 So.2d 1339 (Ct.
App. La. 1985) (a court can award a spouse a share of disposable retired
pay, not gross retired pay, and a court can not divide VA disability benefits
paid in lieu of military retired pay; this approach conforms to the dicta
in the Mansell concerning divisibility of gross retired pay).
Maine
Divisible. Lunt v. Lunt, 522 A.2d 1317 (Me. 1987). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19, §722- A(6) (1989) (provides that the parties become
tenants- in-common regarding property a court fails to divide or to set apart).
Maryland
Divisible. Nisos v. Nisos, 60 Md. App. 368, 483 A.2d 97 (1984) (applies
Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b), which provides that military pensions
are to be treated the same as other pension benefits; such benefits are
marital property under Maryland law; see Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,
437 A.2d 883 (1981)). See also Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371
(1981) (nonvested pensions are divisible). "Window decrees"
that are silent on division of retired pay cannot be reopened simply on
the basis that Congress subsequently enacted the USFSPA. Andresen v. Andresen,
317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399 (1989).
Massachusetts
Divisible. Andrews v. Andrews, 27 Mass. App. 759, 543 N.E.2d 31 (1989).
Here, the spouse was awarded alimony from military retired pay; she appealed,
seeking a property interest in the pension. The trial court's ruling
was upheld, but the appellate court noted that "the judge could have
assigned a portion of the pension to the wife [as property]."
Michigan
Divisible. Keen v. Keen, 160 Mich. App. 314, 407 N.W.2d 643 (1987); Giesen
v. Giesen, 140 Mich. App. 335, 364 N.W.2d 327 (1985); McGinn v. McGinn,
126 Mich. App. 689, 337 N.W.2d 632 (1983); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich.
App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978). Note also Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Mich. App.
774, 323 N.W.2d 553 (1982) (only vested pensions are divisible, but what
is a vested right is discussed broadly and discretion over what is marital
property left to the trial court).
Minnesota
Divisible. Military retired pay not specifically addressed in statute.
Case law has treated it as any other marital asset, subject to equitable
division. Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). This
case also holds that a court may award a spouse a share of gross retired
pay, but Mansell may have overruled state court decisions that they have
the authority to divide gross retired pay. Note also Janssen v. Janssen,
331 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1983) (nonvested pensions are divisible).
Mississippi
Divisible. Powers v. Powers, 465 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1985). In July, 1994,
a deeply divided Mississippi Supreme Court formally adopted the equitable
distribution method of division of marital assets. Ferguson v. Ferguson,
639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994), and Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss.
1994). Marital property for the purpose of a divorce is defined as being
"any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage."
This includes military pensions which are viewed as personal property
and while USFSPA does not vest any rights in a spouse, a military pension
is subject to being divided in a divorce. Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d
523 (Miss. 1995). In Pierce, the Court expressly held that a claim for
division of property can only be viewed as separate and distinct from
a claim for alimony. Since property division is made irrespective of fault
or misconduct, military pensions may be divided even where the spouse
has committed adultery, assuming that the facts otherwise justify an equitable
division of property.
Missouri
Divisible. Only disposable retired pay is divisible. Moon v. Moon, 795
S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Fairchild v. Fairchild, 747 S.W.2d 641
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (nonvested and nonmatured military retired pay are
marital property); Coates v. Coates, 650 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
Montana
Divisible. In re Marriage of Kecskes, 210 Mont. 479, 683 P.2d 478 (1984);
In re Miller, 37 Mont. 556, 609 P.2d 1185 (1980), vacated and remanded
sub. nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981).
Nebraska
Divisible. Ray v. Ray, 222 Neb. 324, 383 N.W.2d 756 (1986); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-366(8) (1993) (military pensions are part of the marital
estate whether vested or not and may be divided as property or alimony).
Nevada
Probably divisible. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 729 P.2d 1303 (Nev. 1986)
(the court speaks approvingly of the USFSPA in dicta but declines to divide
retired pay in this case involving a final decree from another state).
Tomlinson was legislatively reversed by the Nevada Former Military Spouses
Protection Act (NFMSPA), Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.161 (1987) (military
retired pay can be partitioned even if the decree is silent on division
and even if it is foreign). The NFMSPA has been repealed, however, effective
March 20, 1989; see Senate Bill 11, 1989 Nev. Stat. 34. The Nevada Supreme
Court subsequently has ruled that the doctrine of res judicata bars partitioning
military retired pay where "the property settlement has become a
judgment of the court"; see Taylor v. Taylor, 775 P.2d 703 (Nev.
1989). Nonvested pensions are community property. Gemma v. Gemma, 778
P.2d 429 (Nev. 1989). The spouse has the right to elect to receive his
or her share when the employee spouse becomes retirement eligible, whether
or not retirement occurs at that point. Id.
New Hampshire
Divisible. "Property shall include all tangible and intangible property
and assets...belonging to either or both parties, whether title to the
property is held in the name of either or both parties. Intangible property
includes...employment benefits, [and] vested and non-vested pensions or
other retirement plans.... [T]he court may order an equitable division
of property between the parties. The court shall presume that an equal
division is an equitable distribution...." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
458:16-a (1987) (effective Jan 1, 1988). This provision was relied on
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Blanchard, 578 A.2d
339 (N.H. 1990), when it overruled Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645, 421 A.2d
998 (1980) (military retired pay not divisible as marital property, but
it may be considered "as a relevant factor in making equitable support
orders and property distributions").
New Jersey
Divisible. Castiglioni v. Castiglioni, 192 N.J. Super. 594, 471 A.2d 809
(N.J. 1984); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 222 N.J. Super. 36, 535 A.2d 986
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (nonvested military retired pay is marital
property); Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977). Post-divorce
cost-ofliving raises are divisible; Moore v. Moore, 553 A.2d 20 (N.J.
1989) (police pension).
New Mexico
Divisible. Walentowski v. Walentowski, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657 (N.M.
1983)(USFSPA applied); Stroshine v. Stroshine, 98 N.M. 742, 652 P.2d 1193
(1982); LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969). See also
White v. White, 105 N.M. 800, 734 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1987) (court can
award share of gross retired pay; however, Mansell may have overruled
state court decisions holding courts have authority to divide gross retired
pay). In Mattox v. Mattox, 105 N.M. 479, 734 P.2d 259 (1987), in dicta
the court cited the California Gillmore case with approval, suggesting
that a court can order a member to begin paying the spouse his or her
share when the member becomes eligible to retire - even if the member
elects to remain in active duty.
New York
Divisible. Pensions in general are divisible; Majauskas v. Majauskas,
61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984). Most lower courts
hold that nonvested pensions are divisible; see, e.g., Damiano v. Damiano,
94 A.D.2d 132, 463 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). Case law seems
to treat military retired pay as subject to division; e.g., Lydick v.
Lydick, 130 A.D.2d 915, 516 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Gannon
v. Gannon, 116 A.D.2d 1030, 498 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). Disability
payments are separate property as a matter of law, but a disability pension
is marital property to the extent it reflects deferred compensation; West
v. West, 101 A.D.2d 834, 475 N.Y.S.2d 493 (N.Y. pp. Div. 1984).
North Carolina
Divisible but watch for vesting requirements. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)
(1988) expressly declares vested military pensions to be marital property;
the pension must be vested as of the date the parties separate from each
other. In Milam v. Milam, 373 S.E.2d 459 (N.C.App. 1988), the court ruled
that a warrant officer's retired pay had "vested" when he
reached the 18-year "lock- in" point. In George v. George, 444
S.E.2d 449 (N.C.App. 1994), the court held that an enlisted member's
right to retirement benefits vests when he/she has completed twenty years
of service. In Lewis v. Lewis, 350 S.E.2d 587 (N.C.App. 1986) the court
held that a divorce court can award a spouse a share of gross retired
pay, but, because of the wording (at that time) of the state statute,
the amount cannot exceed 50% of the retiree's disposable retired pay;
Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589, may have overruled the court's decision
in part as to dividing gross pay. The parties are not, however, barred
from a consensual division of military retired pay, even though it is
"nonvested" separate property, and an agreement or court order
by consent that divides such pension rights will be upheld. Hoolapa v.
Hoolapa, 412 S.E.2d 112 (N.C.App. 1992). Attorneys considering valuation
issues should also review Bishop v. Bishop, 440 S.E.2d 591 (N.C.App. 1994),
which held that valuation must be determined as of the date of separation
and must be based on a present value of pension payments that the retiree
would be entitled to receive if he or she retired on the date of marital
separation, or when first eligible to retire, if later. Subsequent pay
increases attributable to length of service or promotions are not included.
North Dakota
Divisible. Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1984). See also Morales
v. Morales, 402 N.W.2d 322 (N.D. 1987) (equitable factors can be considered
in dividing military retired pay, so 17.5% award to 17-year spouse is
affirmed), and Knoop v. Knoop, 542 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1996) (confirms that
definition of "disposable retired pay" as defined in 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408 provides a limit on what states are authorized to divide as
marital property, but holds that the USFSPA does not require the term
"retirement pay" to be interpreted as "disposable retired
pay." Knoop is also of interest because it addresses a waiver of
retirement pay associated with the Dual Compensation Act, and the court
acknowledges that once 50% of "disposable retired pay" is paid
out in satisfaction of one or more orders dividing military retired pay
as property, the orders are deemed satisfied by federal law (referencing
1990 amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1)).
Ohio
Divisible. See Lemon v. Lemon, 42 Ohio App. 3d 142, 537 N.E.2d 246 (1988)
(nonvested pensions are divisible as marital property where some evidence
of value demonstrated). But also see, King v. King, 78 Ohio App. 3d 599,
605 N.E.2d 970 (1992) (Trial court abused its discretion by retaining
jurisdiction to divide a military pension that would not vest for nine
years where no evidence of value demonstrated); Cherry v. Figart, 86 Ohio
App. 3d 123, 620 N.E.2d 174 (1993) (distinguishing King by affirming division
of nonvested pension where parties had agreed to divide the retirement
benefits and suit was brought for enforcement only - the initial judgment
incorporating the agreement had not been appealed); and Ingalls v. Ingalls,
624 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio 1993) (affirming division of nonvested military retirement
benefits consistent with agreement of the parties expressed at trial).
Oklahoma
Divisible. Stokes v. Stokes, 738 P.2d 1346 (Okla. 1987) (based on a statute
that became effective on 1 June 1987). The state Attorney General had
earlier opined that military retired pay was divisible, based on the prior
law. Only a pension vested at the time of the divorce, however, is divisible,
Messinger v. Messinger, 827 P.2d 865 (Okla. 1992). A former spouse is
entitled to retroactive division of retiree's military pension pursuant
to their property settlement agreement that provided that the property
settlement was subject to modification if the law in effect at the time
of their divorce changed to allow such a division at a later date.
Oregon
Divisible. In re Manners, 68 Or. App. 896, 683 P.2d 134 (1984); In re
Vinson, 48 Or. App. 283, 616 P.2d 1180 (1980). See also In re Richardson,
307 Or. 370, 769 P.2d 179 (1989) (nonvested pension plans are marital
property). The date of separation is the date used for classification
as marital property.
Pennsylvania
Divisible. Major v. Major, 359 Pa. Super. 344, 518 A.2d 1267 (1986) (nonvested
military retired pay is marital property).
Puerto Rico
Not divisible as marital property. Delucca v. Colon, 119 P.R. Dec. 720
(1987) (citation to original Spanish version; English translation can
be found at 119 P.R. Dec. 765), overruling Torres v. Robles, 115 P.R.
Dec. 765 (1984), which had held that military retired pay is divisible.
In overruling Torres, the court in Delucca reestablished retirement pensions
as separate property of the spouses consistent with its earlier decision
in Maldonado v. Superior Court, 100 P.R.R. 369 (1972). See also Carrero
v. Santiago, 93 JTS 103 (1993) (citation to original Spanish version;
English translation not yet available), which cites Delucca v. Colon with
approval. Note that pensions may be considered in setting child support
and alimony obligations.
Rhode Island
Divisible. R.I. Pub. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (1988) gives courts very broad
powers over the parties' property to effect an equitable distribution.
Implied consent by the soldier cannot be used, however, to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4). Flora v. Flora,
603 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1992).
South Carolina
Divisible. Tiffault v. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d 157 (S.C.1991), holds that
vested military retirement benefits constitute an earned property right
which, if accrued during the marriage, is subject to equitable distribution.
Nonvested military retirement benefits are also subject to equitable division,
Ball v. Ball, 430 S.E.2d 533 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (NCO acquired a vested
right to participate in a military pension plan when he enlisted in the
army; this right, which is more than an expectancy, constitutes property
subject to division). But see Walker v. Walker, 368 S.E.2d 89 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (wife lived with parents during entire period of husband's
naval service; since she made no homemaker contributions, she was not
entitled to any portion of the military retired pay).
South Dakota
Divisible. Gibson v. Gibson, 437 N.W.2d 170 (S.D. 1989) (the court states
that military retired pay is divisible--in this case, it was reserve component
retired pay whe re the member had served 20 years but had not yet reached
age 60); Radigan v. Radigan, 17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1202 (S.D. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 23, 1991) (husband must share with ex-wife any increase in his retired
benefits that results from his own, post divorce efforts); Hautala v.
Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1987) (trial court awarded spouse 42% of
military retired pay, and this award was not challenged on appeal); Moller
v. Moller, 356 N.W.2d 909 (S.D. 1984) (the court commented approvingly
on cases from other states that recognize divisibility but declined to
divide retired pay here because a 1977 divorce decree was not appealed
until 1983). See generally Caughron v. Caughron, 418 N.W.2d 791 (S.D.
1988) (the present cash value of a nonvested retirement benefit is marital
property); Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749 (S.D. 1979) (vested civilian
pension is divisible); Stubbe v. Stubbe, 376 N.W.2d 807 (S.D. 1985) (civilian
pension divisible; the court observed that "this pension plan is
vested in the sense that it cannot be unilaterally terminated by [the]
employer, though actual receipt of benefits is contingent upon [the worker's]
survival and no benefits will accrue to the estate prior to retirement").
Tennessee
Divisible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1) (1988) specifically defines
all vested pensions as marital property. In 1993, the Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court's approval of a separation agreement
after determining that the agreement divided a non-vested pension as marital
property. Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1993). In 1994, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the Tennessee code's reference
to vested pensions was illustrative and not exclusive. As a result, the
court determined that non-vested military pensions can properly be characterized
as marital property. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn.Ct.App.
1994). (Note: A disabled veteran may be required to pay alimony and/or
child support in divorce actions, even where his only income is veterans'
disability and supplemental security income. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S.
619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987) (Supreme Court upheld exercise
of contempt authority by Tennessee court over veteran who would not pay
child support, finding that VA benefits were intended to take care of
not just the veteran. Justice White in dissent argued unsuccessfully that
the state's authority was preempted by the bar to garnishing VA disability
payments, and federal discretion to divert some of the VA benefits to
family members in certain cases.))
Texas
Divisible. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982). See also Grier
v. Grier, 731 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1987) (a court can award a spouse a share
of gross retired pay, but postdivorce pay increases constitute separate
property; Mansell may have overruled Grier in part). Pensions need not
be vested to be divisible. Ex Parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1981),
held that a court cannot divide VA disability benefits paid in lieu of
military retired pay; this ruling is in accord with Mansell.
Utah
Divisible. Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The case
clarifies that nonvested pensions can be divided under Utah law, and in
dicta it suggests that only disposable retired pay is divisible, not gross
retired pay. But see Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990)
(because of a stipulation between the parties, the court ordered a military
retiree to pay his ex-wife one-half the amount he had overwithheld from
his retired pay for taxes).
Vermont
Probably divisible. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 751 (1988) provides
that "The court shall settle the rights of the parties to their property
by...equit[able] divi[sion]. All property owed by either or both parties,
however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court. Title to the property . . . shall be immaterial, except where
equitable distribution can be made without disturbing separate property."
The Conneticut Supreme Court recently held in Krafik v. Krafik, 21 Fam.
Law Rep. 1536 (1995), that vested pension benefits are divisible as marital
property in divorce. Although the issue was not raised in Krafik, the
court noted that the legislative and logical basis for dividing vested
pension benefits would apply to unvested pension benefits as well.
Virginia
Divisible. Va. Ann. Code § 20-107.3 (1988) defines marital property
to include all pensions, whether or not vested. See also Mitchell v. Mitchell,
4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1 Va. App. 75,
335 S.E.2d 277 (Va. Ct. App. 1985) (these cases hold that military retired
pay is subject to equitable division). Also see Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d
267 (Va.Ct.App. 1992) (settlement agreement's guarantee/indemnification
clause requires the retiree to pay the same amount of support to the spouse
despite the retiree beginning to collect VA disability pay - held not
to violate Mansell).
Washington
Divisible. Konzen v. Konzen, 103 Wash. 2d 470, 693 P.2d 97, cert. denied,
473 U.S. 906 (1985); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355
(1975) (nonvested pension held to be divisible); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash.
2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973); In re Smith, 98 Wash. 2d 772, 657 P.2d 1383 (1983).
West Virginia
Divisible. Butcher v. Butcher, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W.Va. 1987) (vested and
nonvested military retired pay is marital property subject to equitable
distribution, and a court can award a spouse a share of gross retired
pay; however, Mansell may have overruled state court decisions holding
courts have authority to divide gross retired pay)
Wisconsin
Divisible. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 Wis. 2d 424, 367 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985); Pfeil v. Pfeil, 115 Wis. 2d 502, 341 N.W.2d 699 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1983). See also Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d
457 (1978) (nonvested pension held to be divisible) and Rodak v. Rodak,
150 Wis. 2d 624, 442 N.W.2d 489, (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (portion of civilian
pension that was earned before marriage is included in marital property
and subject to division).
Wyoming
Divisible. Parker v. Parker, 750 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 1988) (nonvested military
retired pay is marital property; 10-year test is a prerequisite to direct
payment of military retired pay as property, but not to division of military
retired pay as property). See also Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724 (Wyo.
1993) (affirms award of 100% of "disposable retired pay" to
former spouse as property, but acknowledges that only 50% of this award
can be paid directly). Note that this holding is inconsistent with 1990
amendment to USFSPA at 10 USC § 1408(e)(1) which deems all orders
dividing military retired pay as property satisfied once a threshold of
50% of the "disposable retired pay" is reached - see the discussion
in Knoop v. Knoop referenced under the North Dakota section of this guide.)
Iowa Reports
IN RE MARRIAGE OF GAHAGEN, 4-272/03-1731 (Iowa App. 8-11-2004)
No. 4-272/03-1731
Filed August 11, 2004
James Gahagen appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to
modify an order dividing his military pension following the dissolution
of his marriage to Mary Ann Gahagen. He contends the order grants Mary
Ann a portion of his veterans' disability benefits in violation of
the United States Code and Supreme Court precedent. We affirm.
Virginia Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinions
JORDAN v. JORDAN, Va. App. Unpublished (2004)
Record Nos. 2583-03-2, 2616-03-2.
June 22, 2004.
The parties appeal from decrees entered by the trial court in connection
with their divorce. Steven Lee Jordan (husband) contends that the "trial
court's methods of calculating the marital share of [his] military
retirement does not fit the definition of marital share under the statute
in that it awards [his wife] a portion of the retirement benefits earned
by [him] before the marriage."
Virginia Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinions
JORDAN v. JORDAN, Va. App. Unpublished (2004)
Record Nos. 2583-03-2, 2616-03-2.
June 22, 2004.
The parties appeal from decrees entered by the trial court in connection
with their divorce. Steven Lee Jordan (husband) contends that the "trial
court's methods of calculating the marital share of [his] military
retirement does not fit the definition of marital share under the statute
in that it awards [his wife] a portion of the retirement benefits earned
by [him] before the marriage."
Ohio Unpublished Opinions
BYRON v. BYRON, Unpublished Decision (4-22-2004)
Case No. 03AP-819.
Rendered on April 22, 2004.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Bruce A. Byron, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
that granted the motion of plaintiff-appellee, Deborah M. Byron (n.k.a.
Zak), to hold defendant in contempt for failure to comply with the trial
court's divorce decree. Because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
Ohio Unpublished Opinions
SCOTT v. SCOTT, Unpublished Decision (3-23-2004)
Case No. 03AP-411.
Rendered on March 23, 2004.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Ron R. Scott, a pro se litigant, appeals from
a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic
Relations, that amended a prior divorce decree and modified an award of
disposable military retired pay to plaintiff-appellee, Tamara A. Scott.
Because the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand the cause.
Ohio Unpublished Opinions
EVANS v. EVANS, Unpublished Decision (8-22-2003)
Case No. 02CA2869.
DATE JOURNALIZED: August 22, 2003.
{1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic
Relations Division, post-divorce decree judgment in favor of Brenda G.
Evans, plaintiff below and appellee herein. Gregory L. Evans, defendant
below and appellant herein, raises the following assignments of error:
Nebraska Reports
LONGO v. LONGO, 266 Neb. 171 (2003)
No. S-02-394.
Filed June 20, 2003.
Dean Jay Longo appeals from an order of the district court for Sarpy County
dissolving his marriage to Gayliene Marie Longo. He contends that the
court erred in awarding Gayliene (1) an interest in his future military
pension benefits and (2) alimony of $1 per year modifiable only upon a
potential reduction to his future military pension by a potential future
disability offset. Gayliene cross-appeals, arguing that the award of alimony
was inadequate and that the property division was inequitable.
Virginia Court of Appeals Reports
BLACKSON v. BLACKSON, 40 Va. App. 507 (2003)
Record No. 1497-02-2.
May 6, 2003.
Trent Blackson ("husband") contends on appeal that the trial
court (1) did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings
because neither party qualified as a bona fide resident and domiciliary
of Virginia under any provision of Code § 20-97; (2) did not have
personal jurisdiction over him because he was induced into the Commonwealth
by the actions of Andrea Blackson ("wife"), and would not have
been present otherwise; (3) erred in dividing his military pension because
he made continuous objection to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth's
courts and never consented to their jurisdiction; and (4) abused its discretion
in awarding attorney's fees to wife. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
North Dakota Reports
JOHNSON v. JOHNSON, 2002 ND 151
No. 20010288.
Decided September 20, 2002.
[1] Madonna L. Johnson appealed from a second amended divorce judgment
holding she and Antonyio Johnson had equitably adopted her grandchild,
ordering Antonyio to pay child support, distributing the couple's
marital property, and refusing to award Madonna spousal support. We conclude
the trial court's findings on property distribution and spousal support
are not clearly erroneous, but we reverse the child support award and
remand for recomputation of the amount of back child support owed by Antonyio.
Wyoming Case Law
BURT v. BURT, 2002 WY 127
No. 01-109
August 28, 2002
[1] Appellant, Robert L. Burt (Burt), seeks review of a provision of the
district court's divorce decree granting a divorce to him and his
wife. The divorce proceedings were resolved upon Burt's default. Although
no record was developed in the district court, and the issue that Burt
wishes to pursue was not raised there, he asks this Court to review the
district court's division of his military pension. Burt's wife
did not file a brief or otherwise appear in this court.
Virginia Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinions
HUBBLE v. HUBBLE, Va. App. Unpublished (2002)
Record No. 2015-01-4.
August 6, 2002.
Kenneth Wayne Hubble (husband) appeals the decision of the Stafford County
Circuit Court to modify its final divorce decree ordering him to pay Terrie
Lea Smith Hubble (wife) a monthly sum in addition to the payments she
receives through direct allotment from his military retirement plan. For
the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial / Appeals Courts
KRAPF v. KRAPF, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 485 (2002)
No. 01-P-1379.
July 19, 2002.
The defendant appeals from a declaratory judgment entered by a judge of
the Probate and Family Court requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the equivalent of fifty per cent of the military retirement pension that
the defendant would have received from the Department of Defense if the
defendant had not waived his entitlement to the same by accepting disability
benefits from the Veterans' Administration. The defendant argues that
the judge committed error because the judgment constitutes a disposition
of his veterans' disability benefits in violation of Federal law and
modifies the parties' division of marital assets in violation of State
law. Additionally, he claims that the plaintiff is barred from litigating
this issue under the principles of res judicata by virtue of the prior
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for contempt based on the defendant's
alleged failure to comply with a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)
for the apportionment of the defendant's military retirement benefits
pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. Finally, the defendant
contends that the judge of the Probate and Family Court lacked the authority
to enter an order for payment of money under the declaratory judgment
statute, G.L.c. 231A, and to award the plaintiff attorney's fees to
defend against the defendant's appeal in this action. We affirm the
judgment, as modified by this decision, and the order awarding the plaintiff
her attorney's fees in defending against this appeal.
Maryland Court of Special Appeals Reports
COLLINS v. COLLINS, 144 Md. App. 395 (2002)
No. 120, September Term, 2001
Filed: May 30, 2002
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Collins ("Lt. Col. Collins") appeals
a decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County disposing of marital
property, awarding child support, and awarding attorney's fees to
appellee, Cynthia Collins, Ph.D. ("Dr. Collins"). On appeal,
Lt. Col. Collins poses for our consideration three questions, which we
have rephrased as follows: I. Did the trial court commit reversible error
in arriving at the form and the amount of the monetary award, the pension
award, and the reservation on the issue of alimony, made in favor of Dr. Collins?
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial / Appeals Courts
BOTTIGGI v. WALL, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 430 (2002)
No. 99-P-1737.
April 10, 2002.
Dolores Bottiggi was divorced from her husband, Robert Wall, by a final
decree entered in 1976. In 1991, she filed a complaint seeking an equitable
division of Wall's United States Navy retirement pension. A judge
of the Probate Court dismissed Bottiggi's complaint on grounds of
res judicata and on grounds that, even if the merits were open for consideration,
the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10
U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1990) (USFSPA), prohibited the pension division
she sought. From that dismissal, Bottiggi appeals. [fn1] The judge's
dismissal of the case on grounds of res judicata was error and, although
we agree with his resolution of the USFSPA issue, resolution of that issue
left another issue open. We therefore reverse.
Alabama Case Law
EX PARTE SMALLWOOD, 811 So.2d 537 (Ala. 2001)
No. 1000343.
Decided July 13, 2001.
This case presents an issue of first impression in this state: Does the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §
1408, prohibit the courts of this state from awarding greater than 50
percent of a military retiree's retirement pay to the other spouse
as part of a division of marital property in a domestic-relations proceeding?
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reports
WAGNER v. WAGNER, 564 Pa. 448 (2001)
[J-118-2000].
Decided: APRIL 18, 2001.
Section 1408(c)(4)(A)-(C) of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408-1412 (the "Act"), authorizes
a state court to dispose of military retirement pay according to state
law in a divorce proceeding, provided the court has jurisdiction over
the military member. Under the Act, jurisdiction may be premised on the
member's consent. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(C). The question presented
in this appeal is whether the Appellant, Michael F. Wagner, consented
to the trial court's jurisdiction. For all the reasons that follow,
we hold that he did not. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court,
reversing the trial court's order granting Appellant's preliminary
objections to jurisdiction, is reversed.
Nebraska Reports
HARRIS v. HARRIS, 261 Neb. 75 (2001)
No. S-99-914.
Filed January 19, 2001.
Terry Francis Harris appeals from the July 14, 1999, order of the Sarpy
County District Court, which dissolved Terry's marriage to Robin Aleta
Harris; awarded custody of the parties' two children to Robin, with
reasonable rights of visitation granted to Terry; and divided the parties'
marital property. Terry challenges the district court's division of
certain property. For the reasons stated below, we affirm as modified.
Tennessee Unpublished Opinions
CROLEY v. TIEDE, M1999-00649-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. 10-5-2000)
No. M1999-00649-COA-R3-CV.
Filed October 5, 2000. January 2000 Session
Elizabeth Ann Tiede, now Croley, ("the Wife") and Thomas Kent
Tiede ("the Husband") were married June 16, 1963. The parties
separated in September 1989 and were divorced on grounds of irreconcilable
differences on December 18, 1992 by decree adopting their Marital Dissolution
Agreement ("MDA"). Section 3 of the MDA provided: The Husband
shall pay to the Wife, 50% of his retirement benefits, based on 23 years
of employment, such to be paid by direct wage assignment or allotment
if available. Such benefits are to commence by February 1, 1999, or no
earlier than 36 months from the entry of final decree in this cause if
the Husband is involuntarily retired by AAFES. In addition, the Husband
shall take immediate steps, other than financial expenditures, to make
the Wife beneficiary of at least 50% of his AAFES retirement benefits,
if he dies prior to his eligibility for such benefits. If income taxes
are withheld from the total amount of the Husband's retirement resulting
in a higher withholding from the Wife's one-half interest than if
she was taxed at her own rate, the Husband shall pay to the Wife the difference.
The Husband retired in July 1996 and began receiving retirement benefits
as of August 1, 1996. At the time of his retirement, the Husband had 28.863
years of employment with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the
first 23 years of such service having occurred during the marriage of
the parties and the remaining 5.863 years occurring after the divorce.
North Carolina Reports
TORRES v. McCLAIN, 140 N.C. App. 238 (2000)
No. COA99-1166
Filed 3 October 2000
Luchia Torres (plaintiff) and Robert McClain (defendant) were married on
14 June 1975. On 1 June 1976, defendant joined the United States Marine
Corps. The parties had two children during their marriage: Allyson R.
McClain, born 30 January 1977, and Debrah L. McClain, born 5 January 1979.
Ohio Appellate Reports
COLLINS v. COLLINS, 139 Ohio App.3d 900 (2000)
C.A. Case No. 18069, T.C. Case No. 98-DR-241.
Rendered: September 22, 2000. Page 901
Defendant-Appellant, Ralph Collins, appeals from a trial court order finding
him in contempt of court. The trial court imposed a thirty-day jail sentence,
but indicated that Collins could purge himself of contempt by paying his
ex-wife the value of her interest in Collins' retirement at the time
of his separation from the United States Air Force.
Ohio Unpublished Opinions
RANDOLPH v. McCULLOUGH, Unpublished Decision (9-21-2000)
CASE NO. 99-CA-161.
Dated: September 21, 2000.
This timely appeal arises from the trial court's judgment entry adopting
a magistrate's decision distributing a portion of Appellant's
military pension to Appellee. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
North Dakota Reports
JOHNSON v. JOHNSON, 2000 ND 170
No. 990353.
Decided September 14, 2000.
[1] Madonna Johnson appeals a divorce judgment, challenging the trial court's
denial of child support and spousal support and its division of the parties'
property. She also argues the trial court erred in modifying an interim
order without notice during appearances of counsel. We do not address
the latter issue because Madonna failed to raise it at trial. In the Interest
of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 632 (N.D. 1994). As to the other issues, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Tennessee Unpublished Opinions
ERWIN v. ERWIN, W1998-00801-COA-R3-CV (Tenn.App. 6-26-2000)
No. W1998-00801-COA-R3-CV.
Decided June 26, 2000.
Appellee Nancy M. Armstrong Erwin ("Wife") and Appellant Richard
V. Erwin ("Husband") were married on February 11, 1967. The
parties had a son and a daughter; at the time of the divorce, the son
had reached majority but the daughter, April, 17 years old, was scheduled
to graduate from high school on May 26, 1999.
Ohio Unpublished Opinions
WEBB v. WEBB, Unpublished Decision (5-5-2000)
No. 99CA03.
May 5, 2000.
Frederick Wayne Webb ("Frederick") appeals the judgment entry
of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
which granted Michiko Webb ("Michiko") a divorce from Frederick.
He asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the parties' son
to interpret parts of Michiko's testimony. We agree, but find that
any error was harmless. Next, Frederick argues that the trial court erred
by finding that Michiko's payment of approximately thirty six thousand
dollars for their marital residence was traceable to her separate property.
We disagree because competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's
finding. Frederick also asserts that the trial court erred in ordering
only him to pay spousal support because he is older than Michiko and because
the court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances. We disagree
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting spousal
support. Frederick argues that the trial court erred by including the
disability benefit in the division of his military pension benefits. We
disagree because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing
the portion of the military pension that was marital property, which included
the disability benefit. Frederick also argues that the trial court incorrectly
included his disability benefit twice in the calculations regarding division
of his military pension. We agree because all the evidence adduced at
trial indicates that the thirteen hundred eighty-nine figure already included
the one hundred eighty-two dollar disability benefit. Finally, Frederick
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating four debts
to him. We disagree because the trial court did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably,
or unconscionably in ordering Frederick to pay the debts. Accordingly,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Ohio Appellate Reports
DEPAULITTE v. DEPAULITTE, 138 Ohio App.3d 780 (2000)
C.A. Case No. 17847. T.C. Case No. 97 DR 204.
Rendered January 28, 2000. Page 781
Brian E. Depaulitte appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court
of Common Pleas, which overruled his motion to set aside a judgment of
the court on the grounds that it had lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Rhode Island Supreme Court Case Law
GOODSON v. GOODSON, 744 A.2d 828 (R.I. 2000)
No. 98-503-Appeal.
January 21, 2000
This case came before us on the appeal of the defendant, George Osborn
Goodson, Jr., from an order of the Family Court that found him in contempt
of a prior order of that court with respect to payments from defendant's
military retirement pension to the plaintiff, Diana Goodson. This case
was assigned for oral argument, wherein the parties were ordered to appear
and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda
filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown.
Therefore, we shall decide the issues raised by the parties at this time.
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